March 28, 2026

hackergotchi for Grml developers

Grml developers

Evgeni Golov: Converting Dovecot password schemes on the fly without (too much) cursing

I finally upgraded my mail server to Debian 13 and, as expected, the Dovecot part was quite a ride.

The configuration syntax changed between Dovecot 2.3 (Debian 12) and Dovecot 2.4 (Debian 13), so I started first with diffing my configuration against a vanilla Debian 12 one (this setup is slightly old) and then applied the same (logical) changes to a vanilla Debian 13 one. This mostly went well. Mostly because my user database is stored in SQL and while the Dovecot Configuration Upgrader says it can convert old dovecot-auth-sql.conf.ext files to the new syntax, it only does so for the structure, not the SQL queries themselves. While I don't expect it to be able to parse the queries and adopt them correctly, at least a hint that the field names in userdb changed and might require adjustment would've been cool.

Once I got that all sorted, Dovecot would still refuse to let me in:

Error: sql: Invalid password in passdb: Weak password scheme 'MD5-CRYPT' used and refused

Yeah, right. Did I mention that this setup is old?

The quick cure against this is a auth_allow_weak_schemes = yes in /etc/dovecot/conf.d/10-auth.conf, but long term I really should upgrade the password hashes in the database to something more modern.

And this is what this post is about.

My database only contains hashed (and salted) passwords, so I can't just update them without changing the password. And while there are only 9 users in total, I wanted to play nice and professional. (LOL)

There is a Converting Password Schemes howto in the Dovecot documentation, but it uses a rather odd looking PHP script, wrapped in a shell script which leaks the plaintext password to the process list, and I really didn't want to remember how to write PHP to complete this task.

Luckily, I know Python.

The general idea is:

  • As we're using plaintext authentication (auth_mechanisms = plain login), the plaintext password is available during login.
  • After Dovecot's imap-login has verified the password against the old (insecure) hash in the database, we can execute a post-login script, which will connect to the database and update it with a new hash of the plaintext password.

To make the plaintext password available to the post-login script, we add '%{password}' as userdb_plain_pass to the SELECT statement of our passdb query. The original howto also says to add a prefetch userdb, which we do. The sql userdb remains, as otherwise Postfix can't use Dovecot to deliver mail.

Now comes the interesting part. We need to write a script that is executed by Dovecot's script-login and that will update the database for us. Thanks to Python's passlib and mysqlclient, the database and hashing parts are relatively straight forward:

#!/usr/bin/env python3

import os

import MySQLdb
import passlib.hash

DB_SETTINGS = {"host": "127.0.0.1", "user": "user", "password": "password", "database": "mail"}
SELECT_QUERY = "SELECT password_enc FROM mail_users WHERE username=%(username)s"
UPDATE_QUERY = "UPDATE mail_users SET password_enc=%(pwhash)s WHERE username=%(username)s"

SCHEME = "bcrypt"
EXPECTED_PREFIX = "$2b$"


def main():
    # https://doc.dovecot.org/2.4.3/core/config/post_login_scripting.html
    # https://doc.dovecot.org/2.4.3/howto/convert_password_schemes.html
    user = os.environ.get("USER")

    plain_pass = os.environ.get("PLAIN_PASS")
    if plain_pass is not None:
        db = MySQLdb.connect(**DB_SETTINGS)
        cursor = db.cursor()
        cursor.execute(SELECT_QUERY, {"username": user})
        result = cursor.fetchone()
        current_pwhash = result[0]

        if not current_pwhash.startswith(EXPECTED_PREFIX):
            hash_module = getattr(passlib.hash, SCHEME)
            pwhash = hash_module.hash(plain_pass)
            data = {"pwhash": pwhash, "username": user}
            cursor.execute(UPDATE_QUERY, data)
        cursor.close()
        db.close()


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

But if we add that as executable = script-login /etc/dovecot/dpsu.py to our imap-postlogin service, as the howto suggests, the users won't be able to login anymore:

Error: Post-login script denied access to user

WAT?

Remember that shell script I wanted to avoid? It ends with exec "$@".

Turns out the script-login "API" is rather interesting. It's not "pass in a list of scripts to call and I'll call all of them". It's "pass a list of scripts, I'll execv the first item and pass the rest as args, and every item is expected to execv the next one again". 🤯

With that (cursed) knowledge, the script becomes:

#!/usr/bin/env python3

import os
import sys

import MySQLdb
import passlib.hash

DB_SETTINGS = {"host": "127.0.0.1", "user": "user", "password": "password", "database": "mail"}
SELECT_QUERY = "SELECT password_enc FROM mail_users WHERE username=%(username)s"
UPDATE_QUERY = "UPDATE mail_users SET password_enc=%(pwhash)s WHERE username=%(username)s"

SCHEME = "bcrypt"
EXPECTED_PREFIX = "$2b$"


def main():
    # https://doc.dovecot.org/2.4.3/core/config/post_login_scripting.html
    # https://doc.dovecot.org/2.4.3/howto/convert_password_schemes.html
    user = os.environ.get("USER")

    plain_pass = os.environ.get("PLAIN_PASS")
    if plain_pass is not None:
        db = MySQLdb.connect(**DB_SETTINGS)
        cursor = db.cursor()
        cursor.execute(SELECT_QUERY, {"username": user})
        result = cursor.fetchone()
        current_pwhash = result[0]

        if not current_pwhash.startswith(EXPECTED_PREFIX):
            hash_module = getattr(passlib.hash, SCHEME)
            pwhash = hash_module.hash(plain_pass)
            data = {"pwhash": pwhash, "username": user}
            cursor.execute(UPDATE_QUERY, data)
        cursor.close()
        db.close()

    os.execv(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[1:])


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

And the passwords are getting gradually updated as the users log in. Once all are updated, we can remove the post-login script and drop the auth_allow_weak_schemes = yes.

28 March, 2026 10:11PM

March 27, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

March 26, 2026

hackergotchi for Tails

Tails

Tails 7.6

New features

Automatic Tor bridges

You can now learn about Tor bridges directly from the Tor Connection assistant in Tails.

Tor bridges are secret Tor relays that hide that you are connecting to Tor. If connecting to Tor is blocked from where you are, you can use a bridge as your first Tor relay to circumvent this censorship.

In Tails 7.6, choose Connect to Tor automatically when opening Tor Connection. If access to the Tor network is blocked, the bridge configuration screen offers a new option called Ask for a Tor bridge based on your region.

This feature uses the same technology as the connection assistant in Tor Browser outside of Tails, which was introduced in Tor Browser 11.5 (July 2022).

Tails downloads information about bridges that are most likely to work in your region from the Moat API of the Tor Project. To circumvent censorship, this connection is disguised as a connection to another website using domain fronting.

GNOME Secrets

In Tails 7.6, the Secrets password manager replaces KeePassXC.

Secrets has a simpler interface and is better integrated in the GNOME desktop. For example, accessibility features, such as the screen keyboard and cursor size, are working again with Secrets.

Secrets offers to unlock your previous KeePassXC database automatically, because both Secrets and KeePassXC use the same file format to store passwords.

If you miss more advanced features from KeePassXC, you can install KeePassXC as additional software.

The main keyboard shortcuts of Secrets are similar to the ones of KeePassXC, with Shift in addition to Ctrl:

  • Shift+Ctrl+C: copy password
  • Shift+Ctrl+V: copy address
  • Shift+Ctrl+B: copy username
  • Shift+Ctrl+T: copy one-time password

To see the full list of keyboard shortcuts of Secrets, press Ctrl+?.

Changes and updates

  • Update Electrum from 4.5.8 to 4.7.0.

  • Update Tor Browser to 15.0.8.

  • Update Thunderbird to 140.8.0.

  • Update most firmware packages. This improves support for newer hardware: graphics, Wi-Fi, and so on.

Fixed problems

  • Translate the confirmation dialog that appears before saving the language and keyboard layout on the USB stick. (#21448)

  • Fix the Learn More button in the Thunderbird migration notification. (#21455)

  • Fix automated upgrades in Turkish. (#21466)

For more details, read our changelog.

Get Tails 7.6

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  • Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.6.

  • If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.6 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.6 directly:

26 March, 2026 12:00AM

March 25, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

hackergotchi for ZEVENET

ZEVENET

Top Netscaler Alternatives in Europe (2026 Guide)

For years, NetScaler has been one of the most widely used Application Delivery Controllers (ADCs) in enterprise environments.

Many organisations rely on NetScaler to ensure high availability, application security, and traffic management across critical infrastructures.

However, in recent years, companies have started to evaluate alternative ADC platforms for several reasons, including:

  • licensing complexity
  • vendor dependency
  • infrastructure modernization
  • the need for simplified operations

In addition, the growing importance of digital sovereignty and infrastructure resilience has encouraged many European organisations to explore alternative platforms.

In this guide, we review some of the most relevant alternatives to NetScaler available today.

What is NetScaler?

NetScaler (Citrix ADC) is an Application Delivery Controller designed to optimise, secure, and control application traffic across enterprise infrastructures.

Typical capabilities include:

  • Layer 4 and Layer 7 load balancing
  • SSL/TLS offloading
  • Web Application Firewall (WAF)
  • traffic optimization and routing
  • high availability clustering

These platforms are usually deployed in front of applications to ensure:

  • performance
  • security
  • availability

Because ADC platforms sit at the entry point of many critical systems, they play a key role in infrastructure reliability.

Why Companies Are Looking for NetScaler Alternatives

While NetScaler remains a powerful platform, many organisations are currently evaluating alternatives.

Some of the most common reasons are as follows.

Increasing Licensing Complexity

Enterprise ADC solutions often require multiple licenses and additional modules to unlock advanced features.

This can lead to increased operational costs and licensing complexity.

Many infrastructure teams now prefer all-in-one platforms that include advanced capabilities from the start.

Vendor Lock-In Concerns

Some organisations prefer to reduce their dependence on a single-vendor ecosystem.

Vendor lock-in can make infrastructure evolution more difficult, particularly when organisations need flexibility to deploy across hybrid environments.

Infrastructure Modernization

Modern infrastructures increasingly combine:

  • on-premise environments
  • virtualization
  • public cloud
  • hybrid architectures

Infrastructure teams, therefore, require solutions that can operate consistently across multiple environments.

Infrastructure Sovereignty

Another emerging topic is infrastructure sovereignty.

Organisations operating critical services are evaluating whether key components of their infrastructure should rely on external technology providers.

This has led some companies to explore European alternatives for their infrastructure stack.

Top Netscaler Alternatives

Below are several well-known ADC platforms used by enterprises today.

SKUDONET

SKUDONET is a European Application Delivery Controller platform designed to provide high availability, load balancing, and advanced security in a single solution.

The platform combines application delivery and cybersecurity features into a unified architecture that can be deployed across multiple environments.

Key capabilities include:

  • Layer 4 and Layer 7 load balancing
  • Integrated Web Application Firewall
  • intelligent traffic routing
  • multi-protocol support
  • clustering and high availability

SKUDONET can be deployed across a wide range of infrastructures, including:

  • bare metal environments
  • virtualized infrastructures
  • on-premise deployments
  • public and hybrid cloud environments

Unlike some enterprise solutions, all advanced capabilities are included in the platform without requiring additional modules or extra costs.

Another differentiator is the platform’s focus on ease of management, allowing infrastructure teams to control load balancing and security from a centralised interface.

F5 BIG-IP

F5 is one of the most established vendors in the ADC market.

Its BIG-IP platform offers advanced traffic management and security capabilities for complex enterprise environments.

Key strengths include:

  • advanced traffic policies
  • broad enterprise ecosystem
  • extensive feature set

However, some organisations report that F5 deployments can become complex to manage and expensive to scale.

HAProxy Enterprise

HAProxy is widely known for its high performance and reliability.

The enterprise edition offers additional features designed for organisations that require professional support and enterprise-grade capabilities.

Strengths include:

  • high performance
  • scalability
  • strong open-source ecosystem

HAProxy is commonly used in environments that require high throughput and strong customisation capabilities.

NGINX Plus

NGINX Plus is a popular application delivery platform that evolved from the widely used NGINX open-source web server.

It is frequently adopted in environments where DevOps teams prioritise automation and API-driven infrastructure.

Key strengths include:

  • strong developer ecosystem
  • integration with modern application stacks
  • API gateway capabilities

NGINX is particularly common in cloud-native environments.

Netscaler Alternatives Comparison

When evaluating ADC platforms, differences often go beyond feature lists.

Many organisations today face challenges related to:

  • complex licensing structures
  • increasing operational overhead
  • limited visibility across the infrastructure
  • long-term dependency on specific vendors

As infrastructure environments evolve, these factors become increasingly relevant in platform selection.

The comparison below outlines how different ADC platforms typically approach these challenges.

ADC platforms comparison

Note:
The comparison reflects common patterns observed across ADC platforms. Specific capabilities and configurations may vary depending on vendor, deployment model, and use case.

For many teams, selecting an ADC platform is not only about technical capabilities.

It often involves balancing factors such as:

  • operational complexity
  • visibility and control
  • long-term flexibility
  • alignment with infrastructure strategy

When Should You Consider Migrating from NetScaler?

Organisations typically evaluate alternative ADC platforms during several key moments.

Common scenarios include:

  • infrastructure modernisation projects
  • cloud migration initiatives
  • licensing renewal cycles
  • architecture redesigns
  • vendor diversification strategies

These transitions provide an opportunity to reassess infrastructure platforms and evaluate alternative technologies.

Conclusion

Application Delivery Controllers remain a critical component of modern infrastructure.

As organisations continue to modernise their environments and prioritise resilience, flexibility, and security, many teams are exploring alternative ADC platforms.

While NetScaler remains a widely used solution, a growing number of companies are evaluating alternatives that provide:

  • simplified operations
  • flexible deployment models
  • transparent licensing
  • integrated security features

European platforms such as SKUDONET represent one of the options organisations can consider when designing their next-generation application delivery infrastructure.

Explore Alternatives to Netscaler

Organisations evaluating alternatives to NetScaler often start with a simple question:

What would a different approach to application delivery look like in practice?

If your team is currently reviewing ADC platforms, exploring different architectures and deployment models can help clarify the right direction.

At SKUDONET, we regularly work with infrastructure teams evaluating their current setup and exploring alternative approaches.

If it’s useful, you can:

  • explore how different deployment models work in practice
  • Review migration considerations from existing ADC platforms
  • Discuss specific infrastructure requirements with our engineering team

👉 Explore SKUDONET or request a technical walkthrough

25 March, 2026 08:00AM by Isabel Perez

March 24, 2026

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

XSAs released on 2026-03-24

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is not affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:

  • (none)

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:

  • XSA-482
    • In-VM escalation only
    • Qubes OS does not support Secure Boot inside VMs.

About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

24 March, 2026 12:00AM

March 23, 2026

hackergotchi for Purism PureOS

Purism PureOS

Wired Confirmed iPhone’s Worst-Kept Secret: Closed Systems Fail at Scale

For years, Apple has sold the myth of the “unhackable iPhone.” A walled garden. A fortress. A device so locked down that only nation-states could dream of breaking in. Wired’s latest reporting just blew that narrative apart.

The post Wired Confirmed iPhone’s Worst-Kept Secret: Closed Systems Fail at Scale appeared first on Purism.

23 March, 2026 04:28PM by Purism

hackergotchi for SparkyLinux

SparkyLinux

Sparky 2026.03 Special Editions

There are new iso images of Sparky 2026.03 Special Editions out there: GameOver, Multimedia and Rescue. This release is based on Debian testing “Forky”. The March update of Sparky Special Edition iso images features Linux kernel 6.19.8, updated packages from Debian and Sparky testing repos as of March 21, 2026, and most changes introduced at the 2026.03 release. There is no need to reinstall…

Source

23 March, 2026 12:42PM by pavroo

hackergotchi for ZEVENET

ZEVENET

SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.1.5 Released: performance, stability, and operational management improvements

Maintaining a stable application infrastructure isn’t just about major changes. In critical environments, incremental improvements in performance, resource management, and system behavior make a real difference in day-to-day operations.

The new SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.1.5 introduces optimizations focused on efficiency, operational stability, and consistency in traffic and security management.

Key improvements in this release

SSL memory optimization in HTTP/S farms

One of the most sensitive aspects of any ADC is managing encrypted connections.

In this version, memory usage for SSL operations within HTTP/S farms has been optimized, improving efficiency in high encrypted traffic scenarios.

Additionally, internal behavior has been streamlined by removing legacy memory reset functions, contributing to more predictable performance.

Impact: better resource utilization and increased stability under load.

Enhanced logging and diagnostics

Logging mechanisms in HTTP/S farms have been improved, and core dump generation has been introduced, enabling deeper analysis when incidents occur.

This allows technical teams to:

  • detect issues faster
  • analyze complex behaviors
  • reduce troubleshooting time

Impact: greater visibility and diagnostic capabilities in production environments.

Improved APT operations management

A wait-lock system has been introduced to prevent concurrent APT executions.

In environments where tasks are automated or multiple operations are managed simultaneously, this avoids conflicts during package management.

Impact: improved system stability and reduced risk of inconsistencies.

Included fixes

WebGUI – HSTS configuration

An issue in the WebGUI template affecting HSTS configuration has been resolved.

Behavior and rendering are now consistent with the defined configuration.

WAF – Ruleset management

The ruleset deactivation process in the WAF has been improved.

The WebGUI now correctly updates the payload, ensuring that rule changes are consistently reflected.

Impact: increased reliability in managing security policies.

Why do these improvements matter?

In modern ADC platforms like SKUDONET, the challenge isn’t just distributing traffic—it’s doing so efficiently, securely, and with full observability.

Small improvements in:

  • memory management
  • operational control
  • configuration consistency

have a direct impact on:

  • service availability
  • user experience
  • operational workload

As defined in SKUDONET’s architecture, the ADC acts as a central point for availability, security, and performance in application delivery.

Conclusion

Version 10.1.5 strengthens key aspects of day-to-day operations:

  • more efficient resource usage
  • improved diagnostic capabilities
  • more predictable system behavior
  • enhanced WAF management

It doesn’t introduce disruptive changes, but it does deliver meaningful improvements that reinforce stability and reliability in production environments.

If you’re looking to improve the stability and security of your infrastructure without adding complexity, discover how SKUDONET adapts to physical, virtual, and cloud environments with a unified approach to Application Delivery—try it free for 30 days.

If you work with SKUDONET Enterprise Edition or want to stay up to date with the latest technical updates, visit our Timeline.

23 March, 2026 11:13AM by Isabel Perez

March 20, 2026

hackergotchi for VyOS

VyOS

VyOS Stream 2026.03 is available for download

Hello, Community!

VyOS Stream 2026.03 is available for download now. It features multiple backports from the rolling release, including restored ability to directly upgrade from VyOS 1.3.x, a big rework of the VPP CLI, post-quantum pre-shared key support for IPsec, and multiple bug fixes.

20 March, 2026 09:28AM by Daniil Baturin (daniil@sentrium.io)

March 19, 2026

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

Patch Now! 7 New Critical Vulnerabilities in Veeam Backup & Replication

On March 12th, 2026, Veeam published two security advisories containing 7 critical and one high-severity vulnerability in its Backup & Replication server. The flaws cumulatively affect the version 12 and 13 builds. Although there are no reports of active exploitation or public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits available yet, Veeam has appeared on CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities […]

19 March, 2026 09:07AM by Joseph Lee

March 18, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

(中文) 还在“养虾”?deepin 请你吃“虾”了

Sorry, this entry is only available in 中文.

18 March, 2026 11:11AM by xiaofei

hackergotchi for ZEVENET

ZEVENET

OWASP CRS and Fail Fast: Improving Attack Detection in WAFs and Reverse Proxies

In web application security, detecting attacks as early as possible is critical.
Every millisecond that a malicious request travels through an infrastructure increases backend exposure and consumes unnecessary resources.

Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) based on the OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) have become one of the most widely used mechanisms to protect applications against attacks such as:

  • SQL Injection
  • Command Injection
  • Path Traversal
  • Remote Code Execution
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

However, when these rules are integrated into modern high-performance reverse proxies, a limitation appears due to the historical processing model inherited from ModSecurity.

In this article we will analyze:

  • how the OWASP CRS inspection pipeline works
  • what issue appears in modern reverse proxies
  • how applying the fail fast principle can improve security

We will also explain how SKUDONET has implemented this approach to stop attacks as early as possible in the WAF data path.

In perimeter security, stopping an attack one step earlier in the data flow can make a critical difference.

Why OWASP CRS Remains the Standard for WAF Protection

The OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) is one of the most widely used rule sets for Web Application Firewalls.

It is built on ModSecurity and provides predefined rules designed to detect patterns associated with common vulnerabilities, particularly those included in the OWASP Top 10.

Among the threats it can detect are:

  • SQL injection
  • Cross-site scripting
  • Remote command execution
  • Path traversal
  • protocol anomalies
  • malicious bots

The goal of OWASP CRS is to analyze every HTTP request before it reaches the backend, blocking malicious patterns through an anomaly scoring system.

This model has proven effective for years, but it was designed at a time when most proxies did not operate in high-performance streaming mode.

How the OWASP CRS Inspection Pipeline Works 

The ModSecurity Phase Model

OWASP CRS follows the ModSecurity inspection model, which divides the analysis of an HTTP request into several phases.

Simplified pipeline:

pipeline-de-inspección-de-OWASP-CRS

Each phase analyzes a different part of the traffic.

Phase 1

Analyzes information available immediately:

  • HTTP headers
  • URI
  • query string
  • request metadata

Phase 2

Analyzes the full content of the request:

  • request body
  • POST parameters
  • JSON
  • XML
  • complex payloads

This approach works well for deep inspection, but it introduces an important consequence.

A Subtle Issue in OWASP CRS

Within OWASP CRS there are rules that analyze variables available from the very beginning of the request, such as:

  • ARGS_GET
  • REQUEST_URI
  • QUERY_STRING

However, many of these rules are executed in Phase 2.

This means that a request such as:

GET /login.php?user=admin’ OR ‘1’=’1 HTTP/1.1

Host: example.com

contains a SQL injection clearly visible in the URL, yet it may not be evaluated until Phase 2.

From a security perspective, this raises an obvious question:

If the attack is already detectable in Phase 1, why wait until Phase 2 to block it?

The Security Principle: Fail Fast

In system architecture there is a fundamental principle:

Fail Fast

A system should detect invalid conditions as early as possible in the execution flow.

Applied to a WAF, this means:

An attack should be stopped as soon as it becomes detectable.

Not later.

How Modern High-Performance Reverse Proxies Work

Modern reverse proxies are designed to reduce:

  • latency
  • memory consumption
  • buffering

To achieve this, many proxies operate in streaming mode.

An efficient proxy may process a request in the following way:

  1. Receive HTTP headers
  2. Analyze them
  3. Immediately forward them to the backend
  4. Later receive the request body
  5. Analyze and forward it

Simplified flow:

REVERSE PROXY HIGH-PERFORMANCE PROCESSING PIPELINE

But when combined with OWASP CRS, a problem appears.

The Conflict Between High-Performance Proxies and OWASP CRS

If the proxy operates in streaming mode while OWASP CRS follows its traditional model:

  1. WAF Phase 1 executes (but the full evaluation is completed in Phase 2)
  2. Headers are forwarded to the backend
  3. The request body arrives later
  4. WAF Phase 2 executes, (completing the evaluation started in Phase 1).
  5. The body is forwarded to the backend

This means the backend may receive part of the request before the WAF has made the final decision.

From a security perspective, this is suboptimal.

Architecture Comparison: Traditional Pipeline vs Fail Fast

High-Performance Proxy with Traditional CRS 

TRADITIONAL WAF PIPELINE

Result:

  • the backend has already received traffic
  • part of the attack has already progressed through the infrastructure

Fail Fast Pipeline

SKUDONET FAIL FAST WAF

In this model, the attack is stopped at the earliest possible point in the data path.

Applying the SKUDONET Fail Fast Approach to the WAF

To address this problem, SKUDONET implemented an approach based on the fail fast principle.

The idea is simple:

If an attack can be detected in Phase 1, it should be evaluated in Phase 1.

This requires partially reorganizing the logic of OWASP CRS rules.

Technical Example: CRS Rules That Can Be Evaluated Earlier

A simplified CRS rule example might look like this:

SecRule ARGS_GET “@detectSQLi” \

“id:942100,\

phase:2,\

block,\

msg:’SQL Injection Attack Detected'”

Here we see the key issue:

phase:2

Even if the attack pattern appears in the URL, the rule may execute later.

Conceptually, an early detection could be evaluated like this:

SecRule REQUEST_URI “@detectSQLi” \

“id:942100,\

phase:1,\

block”

This allows attacks to be detected before the traffic progresses through the processing pipeline.

Want to see how this works in practice?

Try the SKUDONET WAF Demo

Early Evaluation (Phase 1) 

At this stage the WAF analyzes elements available from the start of the request:

  • headers
  • URL
  • query string

Examples of early detection include:

  • SQL injection in the URL
  • command injection
  • path traversal
  • header anomalies

Simplified flow:

SKUDONET WAF PHASE 1

If the attack is detected here, the request never reaches the backend.

Deep Evaluation (Phase 2) 

When the body arrives, the second inspection phase runs:

SKUDONET WAF PHASE 2

This phase enables the detection of more complex attack patterns.

Conclusion

OWASP CRS remains one of the most important tools for protecting web applications.

However, when deployed in modern high-performance architectures, the traditional phase model may introduce certain limitations, particularly in environments where reverse proxies operate in streaming mode.

The fail fast principle offers a clear solution:
detect attacks as early as possible in the processing flow and block them before they progress through the infrastructure.

This approach allows organizations to:

  • identify threats in early stages of the request
  • reduce backend exposure
  • improve the overall efficiency of the security system

In modern infrastructures, every millisecond matters.
And in perimeter security, stopping an attack one step earlier can make all the difference.

Platforms like SKUDONET apply this fail fast approach directly within the reverse proxy pipeline, allowing attacks to be stopped as early as possible in the WAF data path.

FAQ

What is fail fast in cybersecurity?

Fail fast is a design principle where systems detect invalid or malicious conditions as early as possible. In WAF architectures, this means identifying and blocking malicious requests at the earliest stage of the inspection pipeline.

What is OWASP CRS?

OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) is a collection of security rules used by Web Application Firewalls to detect common web attacks such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), and command injection.

Why can OWASP CRS delay attack detection?

Some OWASP CRS rules analyze request parameters during Phase 2 of the ModSecurity inspection model, even when malicious patterns may already be visible earlier in the request lifecycle.

Why is the fail fast principle important for reverse proxies?

High-performance reverse proxies often forward HTTP headers to the backend before the full request body is received. Detecting attacks early prevents malicious requests from reaching backend services and reduces unnecessary resource consumption.

What role does a WAF play in an ADC?

In modern Application Delivery Controllers (ADC), the Web Application Firewall is integrated directly into the Layer-7 proxy pipeline, allowing malicious traffic to be inspected and blocked before it reaches application servers.

See Fail Fast WAF Protection in Action

If you want to see how the fail fast approach works in a real reverse proxy environment, you can test the SKUDONET platform.

Start the SKUDONET Demo

 

18 March, 2026 09:23AM by Isabel Perez

March 17, 2026

SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.1.4 Released: Full Control of Fail Fast, Improved WAF Accuracy, and Critical Fixes

SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 10.1.4 is now available, consolidating the improvements introduced in version 10.1.3 and adding critical fixes and enhancements to ensure greater stability, more accurate security processing, and better control over threat mitigation.

This release responds directly to issues identified after the previous version, delivering a more refined and reliable platform for production environments .

In addition to resolving bugs, version 10.1.4 introduces a key evolution of the Fail Fast capability, giving administrators full control over how and when malicious traffic is blocked.

What’s new in SKUDONET EE 10.1.4

Full control of Fail Fast with SKD_FAIL_FAST

Version 10.1.3 introduced the concept of Fail Fast within the IPDS engine. Now, version 10.1.4 takes it a step further.

A new variable, SKD_FAIL_FAST, allows administrators to enable or disable early-stage request blocking during rule evaluation.

What does this mean in practice?

  • Malicious requests can be blocked earlier in the inspection pipeline 
  • Security decisions are applied before full rule processing completes
  • Unnecessary processing of suspicious traffic is reduced

Why it matters

In high-traffic or attack scenarios:

  • Reduces CPU and memory consumption
  • Improves response time under attack
  • Prevents backend overload

This gives teams granular control over security behavior, allowing them to adapt protection strategies depending on performance or security requirements.

Improved OWASP CRS rule processing

The handling of OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) rules has been improved to ensure they are evaluated in the correct processing phases.

Problem

Incorrect rule evaluation phases can lead to:

  • False positives
  • Missed detections
  • Inconsistent behavior

Solution

  • Rules are now executed in their intended phases
  • Detection accuracy is improved
  • Alignment with OWASP standards is reinforced

This results in a more reliable WAF behavior, especially in environments with:

  • APIs
  • Complex payloads
  • Custom security rules

Improved WAF validation in HTTP/S farms

Version 10.1.4 introduces enhanced validation and consistency checks for WAF rulesets applied to HTTP/S farms.

Impact

  • Ensures correct rule configuration
  • Prevents misconfigurations before deployment
  • Improves reliability of applied security policies

For administrators, this means fewer unexpected behaviors and more predictable WAF enforcement in production.

Bug fixes for production stability

This release includes critical fixes that address issues detected in previous versions:

Improved WAF reload behavior in HTTP/S farms

  • WAF reload processes now ensure a more consistent application of changes
  • Configuration updates are applied in a more reliable and predictable way
  • Improved consistency across running farms during policy updates

This enhancement provides administrators with greater confidence when applying changes to active environments, reducing variability and ensuring smoother WAF policy updates in production.

Key improvements introduced in 10.1.3 (included in this release)

Version 10.1.4 also includes all improvements from 10.1.3, ensuring a consolidated and stable release.

System performance optimizations

System-level tuning improves:

  • Resource management
  • Service scheduling
  • Overall responsiveness

This allows the ADC to maintain stability under high traffic loads and intensive processing scenarios.

Improved service management in the GUI

The services view now includes a permanent sorting option, making it easier to:

  • Navigate large service lists
  • Manage multiple farms
  • Operate complex infrastructures

A small UX improvement with a big operational impact.

Introduction of Fail Fast in IPDS

Version 10.1.3 introduced the Fail Fast concept, enabling:

  • Immediate blocking of malicious requests
  • Reduced unnecessary processing
  • Faster response to automated threats

Version 10.1.4 builds on this by adding control through SKD_FAIL_FAST.

Why Fail Fast changes application security

Fail Fast is not just a feature — it’s a change in how security is applied at the ADC level.

Traditional approach

  • Requests are fully processed
  • Security rules are evaluated step by step
  • Malicious traffic consumes resources before being blocked

Fail Fast approach

  • Malicious patterns are detected early
  • Requests are dropped immediately
  • Backend and ADC resources are preserved

This is especially critical in:

  • DDoS-like scenarios
  • Bot attacks
  • API abuse

Fail Fast turns the ADC into a more proactive and efficient security layer.

Why this update matters for production environments

This release directly impacts three key areas:

Stability

Fixes ensure predictable behavior in WAF and routing-related operations.

Security accuracy

Better OWASP CRS handling and validation improve detection quality and reduce false positives.

Performance efficiency

Fail Fast and system optimizations reduce resource usage and improve response times under load.

If you work with SKUDONET Enterprise Edition or want to stay up to date with the latest technical updates, visit our Timeline.

If you’d like to experience these improvements firsthand, try the SKUDONET Enterprise Edition 30-day trial.

17 March, 2026 05:37PM by Isabel Perez

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

XSAs released on 2026-03-17

The Xen Project has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs). The security of Qubes OS is affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:

XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:

About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor as part of its architecture. When the Xen Project publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker, which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

17 March, 2026 12:00AM

QSB-110: Use after free of paging structures in EPT (XSA-480)

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 110: Use after free of paging structures in EPT (XSA-480). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 110


             ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 110 ]===---

                              2026-03-17

         Use after free of paging structures in EPT (XSA-480)

User action
------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Summary
--------

On 2026-03-17, the Xen Project published XSA-480, "Use after free of
paging structures in EPT" [3]:
| The Intel EPT paging code uses an optimization to defer flushing of any cached
| EPT state until the p2m lock is dropped, so that multiple modifications done
| under the same locked region only issue a single flush.
| 
| Freeing of paging structures however is not deferred until the flushing is
| done, and can result in freed pages transiently being present in cached state.
| Such stale entries can point to memory ranges not owned by the guest, thus
| allowing access to unintended memory regions.

Impact
-------

On affected systems, an attacker controlling any PVH or HVM qube can attempt
to exploit this vulnerability in order to compromise Qubes OS.

Affected systems
-----------------

Only x86 Intel systems are affected.

Patching
---------

The following packages contain security updates that address the
vulnerabilities described in this bulletin:

  For Qubes 4.2, in dom0:
  - Xen packages version 4.17.6-3
  For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
  - Xen packages version 4.19.4-5

These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the packages should be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take
effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new Xen
binaries.

Credits
--------

See the original Xen Security Advisory and linked publications.

References
-----------

[1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/
[2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/
[3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-480.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Source: qsb-110-2026.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=gtVw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: qsb-110-2026.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=2DP5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: qsb-110-2026.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team. A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally. However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.)

  1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

    $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
    gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
    gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
    gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
    gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 1
    gpg:               imported: 1
    

    (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.)

  2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

    $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
    gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
    This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
    There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
       
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    gpg> fpr
    pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
     Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
    
  3. Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.

    Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.

  4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

    gpg> trust
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
    (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
       
      1 = I don't know or won't say
      2 = I do NOT trust
      3 = I trust marginally
      4 = I trust fully
      5 = I trust ultimately
      m = back to the main menu
       
    Your decision? 5
    Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
    Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
    unless you restart the program.
       
    gpg> q
    
  5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

    $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
    Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
    remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
    remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
    remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
    remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
    Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
    Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
    
  6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.)

    $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
    gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
    gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
    gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
    gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 17
    gpg:               imported: 16
    gpg:              unchanged: 1
    gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
    gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
    gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
    
  7. Verify signed Git tags.

    $ cd qubes-secpack/
    $ git tag -v `git describe`
    object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    type commit
    tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
    tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
       
    Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    

    The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.

  8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

    $ cd QSBs/
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    $ cd ../canaries/
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    

    Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.

For this announcement (QSB-110), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify qsb-110-2026.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-110-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify qsb-110-2026.txt.sig.simon qsb-110-2026.txt

You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-110 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

17 March, 2026 12:00AM

March 16, 2026

hackergotchi for Purism PureOS

Purism PureOS

PureOS Crimson Development Report: January and February 2026 – Beta Released

We are very pleased to announce that the PureOS Crimson beta is released! This means that we have a new set of install images for all devices - Librem 5, Librem 11, servers, and PCs - and we have a path to upgrade existing installations from Byzantium.

The post PureOS Crimson Development Report: January and February 2026 – Beta Released appeared first on Purism.

16 March, 2026 08:30PM by Purism

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

Peacocks and crows in IT security

A field report on open source, competition, enforcement of rights, and the question of how to defend a fair and sustainable open source ecosystem. Summary This report describes a real case of misuse of open source software using the example of OPENVAS, the open source vulnerability management system we developed. A market participant had systematically […]

16 March, 2026 07:43AM by Greenbone AG

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

Fedora 43 templates available for Qubes OS 4.2

The following new Fedora 43 templates are now available for Qubes OS 4.2:

  • fedora-43-xfce (default Fedora template with the Xfce desktop environment)
  • fedora-43 (alternative Fedora template with the GNOME desktop environment)
  • fedora-43-minimal (minimal template for advanced users)

Note: These templates have already been released for Qubes OS 4.3.

There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:

  1. Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. This option is simpler for less experienced users, but it won’t preserve any modifications you’ve made to your template. After you install the new template, you’ll have to redo your desired template modifications (if any) and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template. If you choose to modify your template, you may wish to write those modifications down so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the template and use the dnf history command.

  2. Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.

Note: No user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL).

16 March, 2026 12:00AM

March 15, 2026

hackergotchi for SparkyLinux

SparkyLinux

Sparky 2026.03

New SparkyLinux 2026.03 “Tiamat” ISO images are available of the semi-rolling line. This release is based on the Debian testing “Forky”. Main changes: – Packages updated from Debian and Sparky testing repositories as of March 14, 2026 – Linux kernel 6.19.6 (7.0-rc3, 6.19.8, 6.18.18-LTS, 6.12.77-LTS in Sparky repositories) – Firefox 140.8.0esr (148.0.2-latest in Sparky repositories) …

Source

15 March, 2026 04:57PM by pavroo

March 14, 2026

hackergotchi for Xanadu developers

Xanadu developers

March 13, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

Fedora 42 approaching end of life

Fedora 42 is currently scheduled to reach end of life (EOL) on 2026-05-13 (two months from the date of this announcement). Please upgrade all of your Fedora templates and standalones by that date. For more information, see Upgrading to avoid EOL.

There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:

Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL).

13 March, 2026 12:00AM

Qubes Canary 046

We have published Qubes Canary 046. The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Canary 046


                    ---===[ Qubes Canary 046 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is March 12, 2026.

2. There have been 109 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

       427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
   Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
   backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
   fourteen days of June 2026. Special note should be taken if no new
   canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
   without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

None.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Thu, 12 Mar 2026 11:22:20 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Insta, TikTok and Co.: Is Australia's Social Media Ban for Children Actually Working?
"Reckless, Suicidal Race": The Deadly Threat Posed by Artificial Intelligence
Portrait of a City after Four Years of War: The Courage of Kyiv
U.S. Historian Robert Kagan: "We Are Watching a Country Fall Under Dictatorship Almost Without Resistance"
Nord Stream: How Early Did the CIA Know about the Pipeline Attack?

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Iran War Live Updates: Iraq Closes Oil Terminals Amid Growing Disruption to Global Supplies
Trump’s Iran War Is Causing Problems For His Ally in Italy, Giorgia Meloni
How Russia’s Scorched-Earth Attacks Put Ukraine’s Power Grid Near Collapse
China Wants Its Ethnic Minorities to Blend In. Now It’s the Law.
At China’s Big Political Meeting, a Rare Debate About Inequality

Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
China approves 'ethnic unity' law requiring minorities to learn Mandarin
Epstein used modelling agent to recruit girls, Brazilian women tell BBC
War in Ukraine spills into Hungarian election campaign
Noma head chef resigns from restaurant amid abuse allegations
Hozier, Jessie Buckley and Bruce Springsteen record Shane MacGowan tribute album

Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000017245ca11dddd962050ba2ce7fb38f0ab6a10d4a9cf00


Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/

Source: canary-046-2026.txt

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=7wSH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: canary-046-2026.txt.sig.marmarek

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=DV9o
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Source: canary-046-2026.txt.sig.simon

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.

What is a Qubes canary?

A Qubes canary is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong.

The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)

Why should I care about canaries?

Canaries provide an important indication about the security status of the project. If the canary is healthy, it’s a strong sign that things are running normally. However, if the canary is unhealthy, it could mean that the project or its members are being coerced in some way.

What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?

Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:

  • Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
  • Missing statement(s). Canaries include a set of numbered statements at the top. These statements are generally the same across canaries, except for specific numbers and dates that have changed since the previous canary. If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
  • Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.

No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:

  • Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
  • Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
  • Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
  • Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of the statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
  • Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).

In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it (with valid signatures), you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?

A PGP signature is a cryptographic digital signature made in accordance with the OpenPGP standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all canaries so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether canaries are genuine. The only way to be certain that a canary is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a canary is authentic?

If you fail to notice that a canary is unhealthy or has died, you may continue to trust the Qubes security team even after they have signaled via the canary (or lack thereof) that they been compromised or coerced.

Alternatively, an adversary could fabricate a canary in an attempt to deceive the public. Such a canary would not be validly signed, but users who neglect to check the signatures on the fake canary would not be aware of this, so they may mistakenly believe it to be genuine, especially if it closely mimics the language of authentic canaries. Such falsified canaries could include manipulated text designed to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a canary?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software.)

  1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

    $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
    gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
    gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
    gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
    gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 1
    gpg:               imported: 1
    

    (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.)

  2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

    $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
    gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
    This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
    There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
       
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    gpg> fpr
    pub   rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
     Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
    
  3. Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.

    Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.

  4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

    gpg> trust
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: unknown       validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
       
    Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
    (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
       
      1 = I don't know or won't say
      2 = I do NOT trust
      3 = I trust marginally
      4 = I trust fully
      5 = I trust ultimately
      m = back to the main menu
       
    Your decision? 5
    Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
       
    pub  rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
         created: 2010-04-01  expires: never       usage: SC
         trust: ultimate      validity: unknown
    [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
    Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
    unless you restart the program.
       
    gpg> q
    
  5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.

    $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
    Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
    remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done.
    remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done.
    remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done.
    remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591
    Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done.
    Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done.
    
  6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our PGP key policies for important information about these keys.)

    $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
    gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys
    gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported
    gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key
    gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported
    gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed
    gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported
    gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported
    gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory
    gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
    gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported
    gpg: Total number processed: 17
    gpg:               imported: 16
    gpg:              unchanged: 1
    gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
    gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   6  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
    gpg: depth: 1  valid:   6  signed:   0  trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u
    
  7. Verify signed Git tags.

    $ cd qubes-secpack/
    $ git tag -v `git describe`
    object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    type commit
    tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6
    tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100
       
    Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    

    The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key. The [full] indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK.

  8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.:

    $ cd QSBs/
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt
    gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    $ cd ../canaries/
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A
    gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full]
    $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt
    gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST
    gpg:                using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490
    gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full]
    

    Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each gpg --verify command should always start with gpg: Good signature from... followed by an appropriate key.

For this announcement (Qubes Canary 046), the commands are:

$ gpg --verify canary-046-2026.txt.sig.marmarek canary-046-2026.txt
$ gpg --verify canary-046-2026.txt.sig.simon canary-046-2026.txt

You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the Qubes Canary 046 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created.

13 March, 2026 12:00AM

March 12, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

deepin App Store Upgraded!

deepin, a prominent open-source operating system recognized globally with an impressive ranking on DistroWatch, consistently focuses on optimizing the desktop experience. Recently, the official App Store has completed a new round of upgrades. This all-in-one application management platform now features over 100,000 commonly used applications spanning scenarios like office work, daily life, and entertainment. These officially verified, reliable resources comprehensively meet the needs of both individual and enterprise users, ensuring safety and peace of mind. This upgrade focuses on practical features, visual experience, and bug fixes. It delivers comprehensive enhancements across operational experience, ecosystem integration, interface layout, and management efficiency, ...Read more

12 March, 2026 02:54AM by xiaofei

March 11, 2026

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

Greenbone’s OPENVAS SCAN Now Covers Red Hat 10 and Rocky Linux 10 Security Advisories!

Operating system (OS) security updates are critical for maintaining a strong enterprise security posture. OS vulnerabilities in on-prem and cloud assets, fleets of staff workstations, development environments, container hosts, virtualization platforms, and edge infrastructure may offer an attacker the initial access they need to execute a costly cyber attack. Linux, especially Red Hat Enterprise Linux […]

11 March, 2026 01:38PM by Greenbone AG

hackergotchi for VyOS

VyOS

MWC Barcelona 2026 Recap: Driving the Future of Open Networking

Another MWC Barcelona has come to an end, and what a strong week it was for VyOS Networks. 

We were proud to be part of one of the most important global gatherings in telecom, cloud, and infrastructure, where we met with customers, partners, and industry leaders navigating familiar challenges: vendor lock-in, licensing complexity, fragmented tooling, and growing performance demands across cloud, edge, and on-prem environments.

That is exactly where VyOS continues to stand out.

11 March, 2026 10:09AM by Gizem Yigit (g.yigit@vyos.io)

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

March 10, 2026

hackergotchi for VyOS

VyOS

VyOS Project March 2026 Update

Hello, Community! The somewhat belated development update that covers changes in the VyOS rolling release in February is finally here. A lot of our attention in February went to VyOS Stream 2026.02, promoting VyOS at MWC Barcelona 2026, and the ongoing work on VyOS 1.5.0. However, there are quite a few updates in rolling that are worth a mention, including support for background operations in the HTTP API, multiple VPP CLI design improvements, and a whole bunch of bug fixes.

10 March, 2026 01:11PM by Daniil Baturin (daniil@sentrium.io)

March 09, 2026

hackergotchi for ArcheOS

ArcheOS

R_evolution: a small webapp to explain Human Evolution

 In 2023 I was invited to give a lecture on human evolution at our local high school (Liceo Bertrand Russell). In that occasion I developed a digital presentation with the open source tool impress.js and Strut, using the open material of the exhibition "Facce. I molti volti della storia umana" and integrating a webapp done with Odyssey.jso create an interactive journey through hominid fossils, linking their geographical locations with the forensic facial reconstructions we realized at Arc-Team.

Fast forward to today: I had to give the same lesson, so I decided to dust off that old project, but as often happens with "vintage" web code, it was broken.

The Power of Open Source AI

To bring the project back to life, I experimented with OpenCode, an Open Source AI application. The process was surprisingly smooth; the AI helped me refactor the legacy code and fix the dependencies that had broken over the years.

This sparked an idea: why keep this resource on a local drive when it can still serve a purpose?

Introducing "r_evolution"

I’ve created a new GitHub repository called r_evolution. It’s a simple, functional web app where you can explore the map of human evolution and see the facial reconstructions of our ancestors.

A Call for Collaboration

Currently, the app is in Italian, as it was born for a local context. However, in the spirit of Open Research, I would love for the community to help:

  1. Translate the content into English (or other languages).

  2. Update the data with newer fossil discoveries.

  3. Improve the code for better mobile compatibility.

It was great to see students engaging with these reconstructions once again. It’s a reminder that Open Source isn't just about the tools we use today, but about the "digital stratigraphy" we leave behind—and how easy it is to revive it when the foundations are open.

Stay Open and have a nice day!

 

The r_evolution webapp

 

09 March, 2026 04:14PM by Luca Bezzi (noreply@blogger.com)

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

February 2026 Threat Report: A River of Perpetual Risk

February 2026’s cyber security headlines were dominated by the sudden emerging risk of CVE-2026-20127, a critical-severity vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN. However, this month, other high-risk vulnerabilities impacting widely deployed enterprise software also opened new gaps for attackers to exploit. To effectively defend IT infrastructure, security teams need granular visibility, reliable threat intelligence for prioritization, […]

09 March, 2026 11:23AM by Joseph Lee

March 05, 2026

hackergotchi for SparkyLinux

SparkyLinux

ElectronMail

There is a new application available for Sparkers: ElectronMail What is ElectronMail? Features: – Open Source – Reproducible builds – Cross platform – Full-text search – JavaScript-based/unlimited messages filtering – Offline access to the email messages – Multi accounts support – Automatic login into the app – Automatic login into the email accounts – Persistent email account…

Source

05 March, 2026 04:20PM by pavroo

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

deepin Community Monthly Report for February 2026

Learn more about deepin details, historical versions, user reviews, etc.: https://distrowatch.com/table.php?distribution=deepin I. February Community Data Overview II. Community Products 1. deepin 25.0.12 Internal Testing Launched: File Manager Enhancements, Multi-Screen & Audio Issues Fixed In February, the deepin 25 internal test version 25.0.12 was released, focusing on expanding file manager functionality and optimizing system stability: File Manager Efficiency Upgrade: Supports right-click to pin top tabs, allowing important directories to remain permanently accessible; when previewing images, the sidebar supports drag-and-drop enlargement, making viewing images more efficient for work. Email Function Enhancement: Added email printing feature to meet daily office needs. High-Frequency Issue Fixes: Resolved issues such ...Read more

05 March, 2026 06:24AM by xiaofei

March 03, 2026

March 02, 2026

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

Emergency Patch: CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Actively Exploited Against Critical Infrastructure

! Update March 6, 2026 New Actively Exploited Flaws in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Of the five additional vulnerabilities affecting Catalyst SD-WAN that were disclosed in a second security report the same day, CVE-2026-20128 CVSS 7.5 and CVE-2026-20122 CVSS 5.4 are now reported by Cisco as actively exploited in the wild. No PoCs for either CVE […]

02 March, 2026 01:47PM by Joseph Lee

March 01, 2026

hackergotchi for SparkyLinux

SparkyLinux

Sparky news 2026/02

The 2nd monthly Sparky project and donate report of the 2026: – Linux kernel updated up to 6.19.5, 6.18.15-LTS, 6.12.74-LTS, 6.6.127-LTS – Sparky 8.2 Seven Sisters released – added Linux kernel 6.18 LTS to sparky repos; 6.6 LTS will be not updated any more Many thanks to all of you for supporting our open-source projects. Your donations help keeping them and us alive. Don’t forget to send…

Source

01 March, 2026 03:43PM by pavroo

February 27, 2026

hackergotchi for BunsenLabs Linux

BunsenLabs Linux

[STABLE RELEASE] Bunsenlabs Carbon Official ISOs

The BunsenLabs team are happy to announce our latest release, BunsenLabs Carbon.

Based on Debian Trixie, Carbon has had many improvements, including a new desktop appearance and assistance (coming soon) for users who want to experiment with Wayland.

If you have liked BL in the past, you're going to love this.

There is much more detail in the Release Notes: https://forums.bunsenlabs.org/viewtopic.php?id=9675

Downloads are available from the BunsenLabs website: https://www.bunsenlabs.org/installation.html

A big thank you to all the community members who contributed feedback, suggestions and code!

The BunsenLabs Team

27 February, 2026 12:00AM

February 26, 2026

hackergotchi for Tails

Tails

Tails 7.5

Changes and updates

  • Update Tor Browser to 15.0.7.

  • Simplify the home page of Tor Browser.

  • Update the Tor client to 0.4.9.5.

  • Update Thunderbird to 140.7.1.

  • Install Thunderbird as additional software to improve its security, if you have both the Thunderbird Email Client and Additional Software features of the Persistent Storage turned on.

    Until Tails 7.5, a new version of Thunderbird was released by Mozilla only a few days after we released a new version of Tails. As a consequence, the version of Thunderbird in Tails was almost always outdated, with known security vulnerabilities.

    By installing Thunderbird as additional software, the latest version of Thunderbird is installed automatically from your Persistent Storage each time you start Tails.

    If the Thunderbird Migration dialog below appears when you start Thunderbird, it means that Tails successfully installed Thunderbird as additional software.

    Thunderbird Migration: Tails installed Thunderbird as additional software to improve its security.

  • Include the language pack for Mexican Spanish in Thunderbird in addition to the language pack for Spanish from Spain.

For more details, read our changelog.

Get Tails 7.5

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  • Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.5.

  • If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.5 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.5 directly:

26 February, 2026 12:00AM

February 25, 2026

hackergotchi for VyOS

VyOS

VyOS Stream 2026.02 is available for download

Hello, Community!

VyOS Stream 2026.02 is available for download now. It features multiple backports from the rolling release, including TLS support for syslog, NAT66 source groups, IPFIX support in VPP, FRR and VPP updates, and over fifty bug fixes. It also makes the VPP configuration subsystem use DPDK as the default driver for NICs that support it and fall back to XDP automatically if needed — there is no need to and no option to configure the driver by hand anymore.

25 February, 2026 12:32PM by Daniil Baturin (daniil@sentrium.io)

February 24, 2026

hackergotchi for Clonezilla live

Clonezilla live

Stable Clonezilla live 3.3.1-35 Released

This release of Clonezilla live (3.3.1-35) includes major enhancements and bug fixes.

ENHANCEMENTS AND CHANGES SINCE 3.3.0-33

  • The underlying GNU/Linux operating system was upgraded. This release is based on the Debian Sid repository (as of 2026/Feb/20).
  • The Linux kernel was updated to 6.18.9-1.
  • Partclone was updated to 0.3.45.
  • Implemented mechanisms for cloning 4kn disks to 512n/e disks and 512n/e disks to 4kn disks. Thanks to john (zx1100e1).
  • Improved functions do_ntfs_512to4k_fix and do_ntfs_4kto512_fix by updating Total Sectors (Offset 40) for NTFS.
  • Added a new program, ocs-pt-512-4k-convert, to convert 512B to 4kn partition tables.
  • Rewrote ocs-expand-gpt-pt to be more robust, including 512B to 4kn conversion if mismatched sectors are detected.
  • Added a mechanism to change the master key from a LUKS header. Thanks to nbergont for the contribution.
  • Rewrote ocs-get-nic-fw-lst to retrieve firmware lists directly from Linux kernel modules.
  • Added two more info files in image dir: fdisk.list and blkdev.json. Thanks to arij for the suggestion.
  • Included makeboot64.cmd instead of makeboot64.bat in the live system. Thanks to Tom Hoar.
  • Improved BitLocker support: partitions now work on the clone server (ocs-onthefly), and the system now prompts for passwords again if entered incorrectly. Thanks to Marcos Diez.
  • Enabled the "-edio" (Direct I/O) option in the TUI by default.
  • Restricted the "-smtd" and "-smmcb" options enabled by default to non-x86-64 machines.
  • Added the 'lsb-release' package to the live system.
  • The time synchronization mechanism can now be disabled if ocs_time_sync="no" is assigned in the boot parameters.
  • Updated Brazilian Portuguese translation. Thanks to Rafael Fontenelle.

BUG FIXES

  • Fixed an issue in function udp_send_part_img_or_dev where multicast sending from raw devices failed for partitions with unknown filesystems; it now utilizes partclone.dd.
  • Fixed a bug where ocs-get-dev-info failed to identify extended partitions on MBR disks.
  • Removed extra LVM and LUKS information in dev-fs.list that previously caused partition order errors and failed network clones via ocs-onthefly. Thanks to kokutou kiritsugu for reporting this.
  • Resolved a bug related to restoring MTD/eMMC devices.
  • Appended '--rescue' to partclone options to bypass mtdblock read errors.
  • Fixed a bug where ocs-sr could not find devices using a PTUUID.
  • Updated ocs-live-run-menu to set the TERM as fbterm so box-drawing characters display correctly. Thanks to ottokang for identifying this.
  • Improved ocs-blk-dev-info efficiency and removed double quotation marks from model and serial outputs to prevent menu breakage. Thanks to pete-15.
  • Updated ocs-cvt-dev to avoid name collisions during the conversion process.

24 February, 2026 11:36AM by Steven Shiau

February 23, 2026

hackergotchi for Univention Corporate Server

Univention Corporate Server

Nubus for Kubernetes 1.17: Release Highlights

With this blog post, I am starting a new series in which I present the updates of the roughly monthly Nubus for Kubernetes releases. We begin with a look back at version 1.17, which was released at the end of January and brings many improvements for Nubus operators – including the new Structured Logging format for Kubernetes.

Structured Logging

Since version 1.17, Nubus for Kubernetes offers a new output format for log entries: Structured Logging. This uses the open standard logfmt and generates log outputs that are easy to process both for humans and log analysis tools.

This makes auditing and monitoring in well-known log analysis tools such as the ELK Stack or Grafana Loki significantly easier. Nubus sends the log entries directly to these or other analysis tools available in the data center, where they can be evaluated together with information from other software solutions.

Details on the log format can be found in the release notes and will also be documented in the Nubus Manual in the future.

Moving Away from ingress-nginx

The Ingress in a Kubernetes cluster is responsible for managing external access to the services running inside. It primarily acts as a reverse proxy for HTTP connections and for HTTPS encryption. This Kubernetes component is also modular, allowing operators to choose between different implementations.

Currently, Nubus for Kubernetes in the delivered Helm charts only supports the ingress-nginx implementation. This was long the standard but recently an end of it’s maintenance has been announced. Therefore, operators are forced to switch to other Ingress solutions.

With version 1.17, the dependency on ingress-nginx has been reduced, enabling the use of other implementations in the future. With the upcoming release 1.18 all dependencies will be removed and Nubus will be tested with traefik and HA-Proxy Ingress.

UDM and Provisioning Move Closer Together

The Provisioning component of Univention Nubus ensures that changes from the Univention Directory Manager (UDM), such as new users or groups, are passed on to other systems. Previously, provisioning used its own library, the so-called Transformer, to convert data from the directory service into the Nubus data model.

In version 1.17, this functionality was integrated directly into the UDM REST API. This means that the data model is now consistent throughout, complexity is reduced, and errors caused by different implementations are avoided. For operators, this means more reliable processes with less maintenance effort.

Updates, Updates, Updates

With each release of the Nubus for Kubernetes container images, the underlying open-source software is also updated. Version 1.17 therefore brings numerous small bug fixes and security updates. All details can be found in the release notes.

Der Beitrag Nubus for Kubernetes 1.17: Release Highlights erschien zuerst auf Univention.

23 February, 2026 03:04PM by Ingo Steuwer

hackergotchi for Pardus

Pardus

HackMetu’26, Pardus ve Siber Güvenlik Temasıyla ODTÜ’de Gerçekleştirildi

HackMetu’26’da genç mühendislerle birlikte üretmenin heyecanını yaşadık. 21–22 Şubat 2026 tarihlerinde IEEE ODTÜ Öğrenci Kolu tarafından organize edilen etkinlik; #Pardus Projesi ve TBD Genç Ankara paydaşlığında gerçekleştirildi. 24 saatlik hackathon süresince genç geliştiriciler, Pardus ve Merkezi Yönetim Sistemlerini siber güvenlik perspektifiyle ele alarak uygulanabilir çözümler geliştirdi.

23 February, 2026 07:09AM by Hace İbrahim Özbal

February 20, 2026

hackergotchi for Univention Corporate Server

Univention Corporate Server

Sovereign IT with Open Source: How to Build Your Own Modular Application Stack

Digital independence begins with IT architecture: organizations that want to operate IT services sovereignly need open standards, centralized identity management, and full control over users, roles, and access. This article describes how IAM becomes the solid foundation of a modular application stack – flexible, secure, future-proof, and easier than you might think.

Digital sovereignty is more than an internet hype or marketing slogan. It determines whether organizations can shape their processes themselves – or remain dependent on vendors, licensing models, and proprietary interfaces. The good news: by relying on open standards and open source, a wide variety of IT services can be seamlessly integrated – from file servers to specialized applications – allowing the step-by-step construction of a software stack optimized for one’s own needs, benefiting from its modularity and gaining independence from hyperscaler services.

For applications and services to work smoothly together, a connecting element is required: an Identity & Access Management (IAM) system that handles the integration and management of users, roles, and permissions – securely linking all applications and enabling cross-application data flows. Such an IAM manages user identities, regulates access rights, and allows the automation of entire process chains.
In short: without IAM, there is no application stack – at least not one that remains controllable in the long term.

Below, I will introduce central building blocks for a technically sound implementation of an open IAM and show which standards have proven effective and which architectural decisions make the difference – from single sign-on with OpenID Connect or SAML, single logout via frontend or backchannel logout, user lifecycle management with SCIM, a single source of truth for roles and contextual control of permission assignment, automation and deployment with Kubernetes & Helm, to provisioning.

IAM as the Foundation of a Sovereign Application Stack

Organizations that want to operate an application stack themselves need more than containers, computing resources, and a colorful mix of (open-source) components. The challenge lies in a well-thought-out architecture: how do all services interact cleanly – and how is the overview of access, roles, and data flows maintained?

This is exactly where Identity & Access Management (IAM) comes into play. As versatile as modern applications are, without centralized identity and access management, shadow identities, fragmented roles, and security gaps arise. Without overarching IAM, organizations sooner or later face the same problems as with traditional silo solutions: login credentials circulate via email, former employees retain unintended access to sensitive data, and no one really knows who has which rights. An open IAM solves these problems based on established protocols and interfaces.

A solid foundation alone does not yet make a secure house. The right building blocks are also needed – starting with authentication.

 

Diagram 1: Modular infrastructures managed centrally via a central Identity & Access Management with standardized interfaces

Building Block 1: Single Sign-on and Single Logout

A modern application stack often includes services such as file storage, webmail, video conferencing, office and project management software, or industry-specific applications. To prevent login from becoming increasingly complex and time-consuming for users across these applications, a central authentication mechanism is needed: single sign-on (SSO).

With SSO, users log in once and gain access to all connected services. Authentication is carried out using protocols such as OpenID Connect (OIDC) or SAML. Both are widely adopted open standards supported by almost all modern web applications.

SSO is convenient – but it only solves half the problem. While logging in usually works smoothly, logging out often falls short. Single logout (SLO) means that logging out once also closes all sessions in the connected services. In practice, this step is often overlooked – with consequences for security and data protection. Logging out of the email client does not automatically terminate sessions in the video conference service, file storage, or project platform – a potential avenue for misuse.

Depending on the protocol used, different single logout methods exist – for example, frontend logout, where the browser actively terminates all sessions, or backchannel logout, where the IAM communicates directly with connected services. Which method is possible depends on the capabilities of the respective application and the care taken in technical integration.

Reality shows: while SSO is often quickly hailed as a success, SLO is the real challenge. A missing logout mechanism may seem harmless, but it can become a security risk – especially with sensitive data or public workstations.

Building Block 2: User Lifecycle Management

Single sign-on enables convenient access to IT services, but what happens before and after? Proper user account management requires monitoring the entire lifecycle of identities: from creating new users or groups, through changes, to deletion. This is what user lifecycle management is about.

Many systems rely solely on the login event: an account is automatically created when someone logs in for the first time. This may suffice for simple scenarios – but for controlled, traceable IT management, this model is insufficient. What happens if someone never logs in? Or if a person leaves the organization?

Without centralized event control, shadow identities – accounts existing in the system but no longer linked to a person – emerge quickly. Rights and group memberships are difficult to synchronize, too. Losing oversight is not just an organizational issue but also a data protection and security problem.

For technical implementation, several approaches exist:

  • Via APIs – whether open or proprietary – data can often be written directly to target systems. This offers flexibility but usually comes with high integration effort and low reusability.
  • Directory services (e.g., LDAP-based) can serve as a shared source for user and group data but generally only work with systems that actively access them.
  • System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) is an open standard for provisioning identity data. It allows events like account creation, name changes, or deletion to be transmitted automatically and standardized between systems – including groups and permissions.

Comprehensive user lifecycle management with SCIM or a comparable mechanism is not only more convenient but also safer. It prevents data remnants, reduces errors, and allows identities to be managed consistently across system boundaries – regardless of the size or heterogeneity of the stack.

 

If you would like to explore the topic of User Lifecycle Management in more depth and learn how our IAM solution Nubus enhances security, efficiency, and compliance in schools and enterprises, you can find further insights in this article: https://www.univention.com/blog-en/2025/10/user-lifecycle-management-nubus/

Diagram 2: Manage digital identities centrally with Nubus and provide them across applications

Building Block 3: Permissions and Roles

Access alone is not enough – equally important is the question: what is a user allowed to do within an application? An open IAM must not only manage identities but also assign and control permissions in a differentiated manner. Groups, roles, and permissions must be represented so they can be automatically transferred to different applications. Many IAM systems rely on role models assigning certain rights to user groups – e.g., “teacher,” “employee,” “project manager,” or “admin.”

Technically, there are two common approaches:

  • OIDC allows roles and permissions to be included in claims, which contain information such as groups, role names, or attributes – e.g., role=project-admin. This works well but requires IAM and applications to agree on what each term means. It is not standardized.
  • SCIM goes a step further: it explicitly defines how entitlements and roles can be provisioned. Groups and rights can be transferred and kept consistent across systems – provided the target application fully supports SCIM. Like OIDC, IAM and applications must agree on the meaning of entitlements.

In practice, limits are quickly reached. Many applications interpret claims differently or ignore entitlements entirely. To be safe, a clear architectural decision is required: there must be a leading instance where users, roles, and permissions are managed – a single source of truth. An IAM ideally fulfills this role: storing rights centrally, synchronizing them with other systems, and remaining independent of specific applications.

In addition to static role-based permissions, contextual control is gaining importance: who can access what, when, where, and from which device – modern IAM systems can represent these conditions in a granular manner. This results in a permissions model that is not only differentiated but flexible enough for hybrid scenarios.

Automation and Deployment with Kubernetes & Helm

Organizations that want to reliably operate open components like IAM, directory services, office applications, or file storage need a platform that enables repeatable deployments, updates, and integrations – even in running operations.

Kubernetes has become the standard in many organizations for operating containerized applications scalably and resiliently. Combined with the Helm package manager, complex setups like an IAM with associated services can be described declaratively, installed automatically, and reproduced as needed – e.g., in test, integration, and production environments.

In self-built application stacks, this is essential: without automated deployment, releases quickly become confusing, configurations inconsistent, and extensions risky. Kubernetes and Helm provide structure and make it easier to operate IAM modularly, update it regularly, and integrate it traceably. Prerequisite for this repeatability is a consistent continuous delivery approach. Only when builds, tests, and deployments are standardized and automated can the quality of the overall system be reliably ensured – across many components.

Secure Integration of Existing Systems

Many organizations already have established infrastructures – e.g., a central Active Directory for user management. Achieving digital sovereignty does not require starting from scratch; existing systems can be cleverly integrated.

When introducing an open IAM, it is often sensible to include existing directories initially and import or synchronize identity data from them. In hybrid scenarios, the new IAM can become the leading system or run in parallel to the existing directory, gradually replacing it step by step.

Technically, several options exist: manual exports can be implemented quickly but are error-prone and unsustainable. Better are connections via LDAP, SCIM, or API, where changes in user data are retrieved automatically or event-driven. Crucial is that processes like onboarding, role assignment, and offboarding work seamlessly – regardless of where the data is maintained.

In practice, a gradual transition is often advisable: existing systems remain initially, while new components are integrated and tested according to standards. This allows a controlled change – without loss of functionality but with growing control.

Open Source in Practice: Examples of Sovereign IT

A modular application stack consists of more than individual services – the interaction between them is decisive. Only when identities, roles, applications, and data flows are integrated via open standards does an architecture emerge that can be operated independently, adapted, and sustainably maintained. That this is practicable even in very large environments is demonstrated by the project openDesk, promoted by the Zentrum für Digitale Souveränität.

openDesk relies on a combination of proven open-source components: Open-Xchange for email and calendar, Nextcloud for files, Collabora for online document editing, Element for messaging, OpenProject for project management – and the IAM Nubus from Univention GmbH, which as a central link enables the technical interaction of the components and convenient access to all services via a modern portal. The modular setup works – for example at the Robert Koch-Institut and in the Bundestag administration.

Nubus demonstrates the important role an open IAM can play: it not only manages identities but also centrally controls access rights and provides this information via open interfaces. An example is the ambitious open-source project of the state of Schleswig-Holstein, which is currently building a new statewide directory service with Nubus. This will eventually replace the previous Active Directory environment and enable secure access to specialized applications, devices, and central IT systems – role-based, data protection compliant, and fully under local control.

 

Diagram 3: Modular infrastructures illustrated using the openDesk case study

To get started with a sovereign cloud infrastructure using Nubus as IAM, pre-configured integrations are helpful. For example, the Active Directory connection allows an open IAM to synchronize with an existing AD – including accounts, groups, and passwords. There are also ready-made integration packages for complete applications such as Nextcloud or Open-Xchange, which make connecting third-party software to Nubus particularly easy. Further packages are being developed and gradually released. Connector tools for Google Workspace, Apple School Manager, or Microsoft 365 also support single sign-on to these cloud services. These tools facilitate a smooth transition to open, controllable architectures – without having to replace everything immediately.

These projects show: digital sovereignty is not an abstract goal but can be concretely implemented with open source – step by step, traceably, and sustainably.

Conclusion: IAM as the Key to Digital Sovereignty

Digital sovereignty is not created by a product label but by an architecture that remains open, controllable, and adaptable. Organizations that want to operate IT services themselves or integrate them into existing structures need an IAM that grows with them – from authentication through roles and permissions to full automation.

Many organizations build their own IAM systems from LDAP, scripts, and database reconciliations in hopes of maximum flexibility. Such homemade solutions quickly hit limits: lack of logging, poor scalability, security risks. Using an established open-source IAM, by contrast, offers tested standards, community support, and extensibility – without technical debt.

A sovereign IT stack needs more than containers and services. Only with a central IAM can identities, roles, and access rights be reliably managed – across all applications. It is the connecting element that turns individual parts into a functional whole: interoperable, controllable, and sustainably maintainable.

This article has already been published in Informatik Aktuell and can be viewed here.

 

Do you want to ensure your digital operational capability even in emergency situations and keep critical IT services running reliably?
With “Nubus for Business Continuity”, a prepared, parallel IAM runs in standby mode, ready to take over immediately in a crisis and maintain access to applications, systems, and data. Learn how a sovereign IAM strategy can help you reduce risks and strengthen your IT resilience here: https://www.univention.com/solutions/nubus-for-business-continuity/

Der Beitrag Sovereign IT with Open Source: How to Build Your Own Modular Application Stack erschien zuerst auf Univention.

20 February, 2026 07:09AM by Ingo Steuwer

February 18, 2026

hackergotchi for Purism PureOS

Purism PureOS

Privacy Under Siege

Surveillance, Breaches, and Gaps in the Law It has become clear that privacy risks are not isolated incidents. They are part of a larger pattern.  Major organizations continue to experience large scale data breaches. Brightspeed recently suffered a breach affecting around one million customers. Brightspeed opened an internal cybersecurity investigation in early January this year, after Crimson […]

The post Privacy Under Siege appeared first on Purism.

18 February, 2026 04:55PM by Purism

February 16, 2026

hackergotchi for SparkyLinux

SparkyLinux

Sparky 8.2

There is the second update available for Sparky 8 – 8.2. This is a quarterly update of the Sparky 8 “Seven Sisters” stable release. Sparky 8 is based on and fully compatible with Debian 13 “Trixie”. Main changes: – All packages updated from the stable Debian and Sparky repositories as of February 14, 2026. – Linux kernel: 6.12.69-LTS (6.19.1, 6.12.72 LTS, 6.6.125-LTS in sparky repositories) …

Source

16 February, 2026 01:52PM by pavroo

February 14, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

February 13, 2026

hackergotchi for Pardus

Pardus

Mustafa Akgül Özgür Yazılım 2026 Kış Kampı Tamamlandı

Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi ev sahipliğinde Linux Kullanıcıları Derneği (LKD) koordinasyonunda 4–8 Şubat 2026 tarihleri arasında düzenlenen Mustafa Akgül Özgür Yazılım 2026 Kış Kampı, özgür yazılım ve açık kaynak teknolojiler alanında önemli bir buluşma noktası oldu.

13 February, 2026 07:35AM by Hace İbrahim Özbal

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

hackergotchi for BunsenLabs Linux

BunsenLabs Linux

32 bit support will end with BunsenLabs Boron

Debian - on which BunsenLabs is based - have dropped 32 bit kernels, installers and iso images from the current stable Trixie release.

BunsenLabs will be forced to do likewise, and the upcoming Carbon release will have no 32 bit iso images, or 32bit package repositories.

Users with 32 bit machines can continue to use BunsenLabs Boron for as long as Debian Long Term Support for Bookworm continues, which is expected to be until June 30, 2028:
https://wiki.debian.org/LTS

Previous discussion:
https://forums.bunsenlabs.org/viewtopic … 48#p140748

13 February, 2026 12:00AM

February 11, 2026

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

January 2026 Threat Report: Off to a Raucous Start – Part 2

So far, 2026 is off to a raucous start. With so much activity in the software vulnerability landscape it’s easy to understand the concerns of global executives discussed in Part 1 of the January 2026 Threat Report. This volatility also highlights the value of Greenbone’s industry-leading detection coverage. In Part 2 of the January Threat […]

11 February, 2026 10:20AM by Joseph Lee

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

hackergotchi for Tails

Tails

Tails 7.4.2

This release is an emergency release to fix critical security vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel.

Changes and updates

  • Update the Linux kernel to 6.12.69, which fixes DSA 6126-1, multiple security vulnerabilities that could allow an application in Tails to gain administration privileges.

    For example, if an attacker was able to exploit other unknown security vulnerabilities in an application included in Tails, they might then use DSA 6126-1 to take full control of your Tails and deanonymize you.

    This attack is very unlikely, but could be performed by a strong attacker, such as a government or a hacking firm. We are not aware of this attack being used in practice.

  • Update Thunderbird to 140.7.1.

Fixed problems

  • Fix opening the Wi-Fi settings from the Tor Connection assistant. (#18587)

  • Fix reopening Electrum when it was not closed cleanly. (#21390)

  • Fix applying the language saved to the USB stick in the Welcome Screen. (#21383)

For more details, read our changelog.

Get Tails 7.4.2

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

  • Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.4.2.

  • If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.4.2 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.4.2 directly:

11 February, 2026 12:00AM

February 06, 2026

hackergotchi for Qubes

Qubes

Fedora 43 templates available for Qubes OS 4.3

The following new Fedora 43 templates are now available for Qubes OS 4.3:

  • fedora-43-xfce (default Fedora template with the Xfce desktop environment)
  • fedora-43 (alternative Fedora template with the GNOME desktop environment)
  • fedora-43-minimal (minimal template for advanced users)

Note: Fedora 43 template availability for Qubes OS 4.2 will be announced separately.

There are two ways to upgrade a template to a new Fedora release:

  1. Recommended: Install a fresh template to replace an existing one. This option is simpler for less experienced users, but it won’t preserve any modifications you’ve made to your template. After you install the new template, you’ll have to redo your desired template modifications (if any) and switch everything that was set to the old template to the new template. If you choose to modify your template, you may wish to write those modifications down so that you remember what to redo on each fresh install. To see a log of package manager actions, open a terminal in the template and use the dnf history command.

  2. Advanced: Perform an in-place upgrade of an existing Fedora template. This option will preserve any modifications you’ve made to the template, but it may be more complicated for less experienced users.

Note: No user action is required regarding the OS version in dom0 (see our note on dom0 and EOL).

06 February, 2026 12:00AM

February 05, 2026

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

deepin Community Monthly Report for January 2026

Learn more about deepin details, historical versions, user reviews, etc.: https://distrowatch.com/table.php?distribution=deepin I. Overview of Community Data for January 2026 II. Community Products 2.1 Release of deepin 25.0.10 Version Image: Comprehensive Optimization of Installation Experience and System Interaction In January 2026, deepin officially released the deepin 25.0.10 system image, focusing on experience upgrades for the installation process, file management, and system interaction. Optimized System Installation Experience: Enhanced data formatting prompts during full-disk installation, supporting the retention of user data and reuse of original account configurations, simplifying system migration and upgrade processes. Improved File Manager Efficiency: Added features such as automatic scrolling during file drag-and-drop, ...Read more

05 February, 2026 10:14AM by xiaofei

hackergotchi for GreenboneOS

GreenboneOS

January 2026 Threat Report: Off to a Raucous Start

So far, 2026 is off to a raucous start. The number of critical severity vulnerabilities impacting widely deployed software is staggering. Defenders need to scan widely and scan often to detect new threats in their infrastructure and prioritize mitigation efforts based on the potential impact to business operations, privacy regulations, and other compliance responsibilities. Defenders […]

05 February, 2026 07:04AM by Joseph Lee

February 04, 2026

hackergotchi for Purism PureOS

Purism PureOS

Sim Swap Attacks Surging

SIM swap attacks are skyrocketing. A SIM Swap attack is when cybercriminals hijack mobile numbers by convincing carriers to transfer a victim’s phone number to a SIM card they control. Once successful, attackers intercept text-based authentication codes, unlocking access to cryptocurrency wallets, banking apps, and social media accounts.

The post Sim Swap Attacks Surging appeared first on Purism.

04 February, 2026 06:26PM by Purism

hackergotchi for ZEVENET

ZEVENET

When Open Source Infrastructure Stops Being Easy to Operate

Open Source infrastructure is often a deliberate and well-reasoned choice. It offers transparency, control and a level of flexibility that fits well with how many engineering teams like to build and operate systems. Deploying an open source load balancer or reverse proxy is usually a conscious decision, backed by solid documentation, community knowledge and proven behavior in production.

In most cases, it performs exactly as expected. Configuration is understandable, behavior is predictable and the system feels under control.

The challenge does not appear at deployment time. It emerges later, as traffic increases, environments expand and the same platform has to support more services, more changes and more operators. Configuration grows, operational tasks multiply and the margin for error narrows. Changes that were once straightforward start requiring coordination, validation and caution.

At that stage, the problem is not the software itself. The difficulty lies in operating open source infrastructure reliably as the system grows and operational demands increase.

An open-source load balancer in a growing environment

At this stage, most teams know the technology well. They trust Open Source and often run mature projects like HAProxy, NGINX, Apache, or even the SKUDONET Community Edition. These tools are proven, fast and predictable, and they give administrators full control over how traffic is handled.
As the environment grows, friction starts to appear:

  • A single configuration evolves into multiple files spread across environments
  • Changes require coordination across teams and systems
  • Visibility relies on logs that are not always centralized or easy to correlate
  • Updates and patches must be planned, tested and rolled out manually
  • High-availability setups work, but upgrading them without disruption becomes increasingly difficult

Security adds more pressure. Rules, ACLs or WAF logic exist, but tuning them safely takes effort. When something goes wrong, it is not always clear whether the issue comes from configuration, traffic patterns or the infrastructure itself.

None of this breaks the system. But it slows it down operationally. The load balancer still works, yet running it demands more time, more care and more experience than before. This is usually when teams start questioning whether relying only on community tooling is still the right model for their current scale.

The natural next step: teams start looking beyond community tools

When this point is reached, teams know what is not working and they start by looking around the ecosystem they already trust. Users of HAProxy, NGINX or Apache usually do not want to replace their stack. Instead, they evaluate the commercial or enterprise options built around the same technologies, expecting easier operation, better visibility and safer upgrades.
These editions typically promise:

  • centralized management
  • technical support
  • safer update and upgrade processes
  • additional security capabilities

The problem is that this promise does not always translate into simpler operations. Some enterprise versions keep much of the same operational complexity as the community tools, with configuration-heavy workflows and limited abstraction. Others introduce pricing models that grow quickly with traffic and environments, or platforms that are technically powerful but harder to operate on a daily basis.

SKUDONET Enterprise as the natural evolution from Open Source

SKUDONET Enterprise is designed to remove the operational friction that appears when Open Source infrastructure grows.

Configuration, traffic control and visibility are handled from a single plane, instead of being spread across files, nodes and environments. This reduces the effort required to introduce changes and lowers the operational risk.

In practice, this translates into:

  • Centralized management and visibility, without losing control over traffic behavior or routing logic
  • Simpler operations, where updates, high availability and scaling do not rely on complex or fragile maintenance workflows
  • Security that remains manageable, with clear insight into how rules behave and how traffic is affected
  • Operational continuity, even as environments, traffic volume and teams evolve

High availability, updates and maintenance are treated as part of the platform, not as separate projects that require careful coordination. Routine tasks no longer depend on manual processes or deep system-specific knowledge to be executed safely.

Integration remains straightforward. Existing architectures and deployment models stay in place, allowing teams to add Enterprise capabilities without redesigning their stack or introducing heavy control layers.

Pricing stays predictable as environments scale, avoiding the cost escalation and licensing complexity commonly associated with traditional commercial editions.
The result is a platform that preserves the technical foundations teams trust, while making infrastructure easier to operate, easier to maintain and easier to scale.

If you want to evaluate how this approach works in practice, you can try SKUDONET Enterprise with a 30-day demo and validate the fit in your own environment.

04 February, 2026 01:18PM by Nieves Álvarez

hackergotchi for Deepin

Deepin

(中文) 先进生产力:在 deepin 25 上装 OpenClaw 接飞书

Sorry, this entry is only available in 中文.

04 February, 2026 10:05AM by xiaofei